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2ABSTRACT
In realistic and challenging decision contexts, people may show biases that prevent 
them from choosing their favored options. For example, astronomer Johannes 
Kepler famously interviewed several candidate fiancées sequentially, but was 
rejected when attempting to return to a previous candidate. Similarly, we examined 
human performance on searches for attractive faces through fixed-length sequences 
by adapting optimal stopping computational theory developed from behavioral 
ecology and economics. Although economics studies have repeatedly found that 
participants sample too few options before choosing the best-ranked number from a 
series, we instead found overlong searches with many sequences ending without 
choice. Participants employed irrationally high choice thresholds, compared to the 
more lax, realistic standards of a Bayesian ideal observer, which achieved better-
ranked faces. We consider several computational accounts and find that participants 
most resemble a Bayesian model that decides based on altered attractiveness 
values. These values may produce starkly different biases in the facial attractiveness 
domain than in other decision domains. 
Keywords: 
decision making; Bayesian modeling; facial attractiveness; mate choice; optimal 
stopping
31 INTRODUCTION
Many real-world decisions require optimal stopping. Accept a job offer or keep 
looking? Sell a stock now or wait for the price to rise? Buy a dress today or wait for a 
sale? In such “best choice” scenarios, agents must weigh the temptation to sample 
further options (so as potentially to improve on the current option) against the risk of 
missing the best option if too many are sampled. The classic illustration comes from 
astronomer Johannes Kepler’s search for a wife. After considering several 
candidates, Kepler returned to a previous candidate and was duly rejected. Indeed, 
numerous investigators of this best-choice optimal stopping problem have 
associated it with mate choice (Eriksson & Strimling, 2009; Guan, Lee & Silva 2014; 
Todd, Billari & Simão, 2005; Todd & Miller, 1999), variously naming it the “fiancé(e)”, 
“marriage”, “dowry” or “fussy suitor” problem (Ferguson, 1989). Likewise, behavioral 
ecologists have, for decades, extensively studied how this decision structure relates 
to non-human animal mate choice using empirical studies (Valone et al., 1996) and 
theoretical models (Castellano et al., 2012; Collins, McNamara & Ramsey, 2006; 
Luttbeg, 1996; 2002; Janetos, 1980; Real, 1990). The computational treatments of 
this decision problem (e.g., Costa & Averbeck, 2015) typically address a version of 
this problem where prospects (e.g., potential partners) are limited in number (e.g., 
because of population size) and/or by search duration (e.g., an animal’s brief mating 
season). Agents facing this complication cannot simply set one aspiration threshold 
in advance and then wait for a sufficiently favorable option, as this strategy risks 
missing the highest-ranking available option (Kolling, Scholl, Chekround, Trier & 
Rushworth, 2018). Optimal agents confronting fixed length sequences benefit by 
incorporating finite-choice horizons (Janetos, 1980). 
4Best-choice studies in humans are largely limited to fixed-length searches for 
best-ranked numbers in economic scenarios (e.g., find the car with the lowest 
mileage). These studies have established a pervasive and well-replicated finding: 
participants search too few options, compared to computational ideal observer 
(optimality) models (Bearden, Rapoport & Murphy, 2006; Costa & Averbeck, 2015; 
Seale & Rapoport, 1997; Seale & Rapoport, 2000; Sonnemans, 2000; Zwick, 
Rapoport, King Chung Lo & Muthukrishnan, 2003). The same finding arises in a 
closely related optimal stopping problem: the beads task and its variants. In the 
classic version of the beads task, participants infer the majority color of beads in a 
fictitious hidden jar before they have viewed an optimal number of samples of bead 
colors drawn from the jar (Furl & Averbeck, 2011; van der Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis, 
McKay, 2015; Hauser et al., 2017b). Vul and colleagues identified a number of other 
economic settings where participants make decisions based on undersampled 
probability distributions (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2014). Mechanisms 
asserted to explain undersampling include robust heuristics (Todd & Miller, 1999), 
overweighting of evidence diagnosticity (van der Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis & McKay, 
2017), excessive decision noise (Moutoussis et al., 2011), intrinsic search costs 
(Costa & Averbeck, 2015; Furl & Averbeck, 2011) and urgency signals (Hauser et 
al., 2017b).
Here, our main aim was to test whether humans also undersample in a more 
social decision scenario. We selected the mate choice domain, given that it 
motivated interest in best-choice problems in both mathematics (Ferguson, 1989) 
and behavioral ecology literatures (Castellano et al., 2012; Valone et al., 1996). 
Specifically, we focused on one important factor in human partner choices (out of 
many) – visual attractiveness. Although our initial expectation was that participants 
5might undersample, there was some reason to suspect a different result might 
obtain. Some theories of animal sequential search choices (Janetos, 1980; Real, 
1990), for example, assert that predispositions can bias choices toward phenotypes 
of a certain high quality (Beckers & Wagner, 2011; Ivy & Sakalu, 2007; Valone et al., 
1996) and that these biases may be optimal on evolutionary scales (Cheng et al., 
2014). Insofar as searches for facial attractiveness effectively trigger such 
dispositions, biased preferences toward (relatively rare) high-quality partners might 
be expected to lengthen searches, instead of shorten them. 
Our search task introduces a new approach to studying facial attractiveness 
choices. For the first time, computational models can be applied both as “ideal 
observer” optimality benchmarks and as mechanistic explanations of the 
computations human use when choosing attractive faces. The model we implement 
(Costa & Averbeck, 2015) combines prior information about possible option values 
with probabilistic learning to derive predictions of future outcome values. These 
predictions can then be used to compare currently-available option values against 
the probability of a better option appearing before the end of a fixed-length option 
sequence. This modeling arrangement is well-suited for “full information versions” of 
the best choice problem (Lee et al., 2006), like our facial attractiveness task. This 
model also benefits from being closely-related mathematically to the most 
commonly-used and well-established computational model of the beads task, 
(Averbeck, 2015; Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Hauser et al., 2017a; 2017b; Hauser, 
Moutoussis, Purg, Dayan & Dolan, 2018; Moutoussis, Bentall, El-Deredy & Dayan, 
2011), as common computations underlie solutions to multiple optimal stopping 
problems. The model is also similar to several theoretical Bayesian models of non-
human animal sequential choice (Castellano et al., 2012; Collins, McNamara & 
6Ramsey, 2006; Luttbeg, 1996; 2002). The model draws from the same Bayesian 
framework often used to model behavioral and neural responses related to reward-
guided decision making (Kolossa, Kopp & Fingscheidt, 2015; Solway & Botvinick, 
2012). Likewise, Markov decision processes with dynamic thresholds implemented 
by this model are commonly used for decision models (Averbeck, 2015; Malhotra et 
2018; Huang & Rao, 2013). 
We report here three studies where we implemented a novel facial-
attractiveness version of the best-choice decision task and compared human 
performance with that of a Bayesian ideal observer to measure bias. We tested 
which of multiple computational models best reproduced human behavior in two of 
these studies (that had sufficient data). Models included a biased values model as 
well as rival models that might produce similar behavior. Our primary interest was to 
establish whether the undersampling observed in economic domains indeed reflects 
a peculiarity of human probabilistic reasoning mechanisms that can infect any 
optimal stopping decision domain. If a different result obtains in our task, this calls 
into question whether biases in other new domains can be so easily predicted. We 
will also test gender differences as a secondary, more exploratory hypothesis, as 
some have argued that men and women make different mate choices (Fletcher, Kerr 
& Valentine, 2014). 
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 The three empirical studies
7Informed consent was obtained from all participants in all studies, in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Study 1 enrolled 49 participants, with 
the sample size based on our recent study on facial attractiveness choices (Furl, 
2016). Participants chose a preferred sex (all 26 females and one male chose male 
faces, all others chose female faces). Because Study 1 offered roughly equally-sized 
face/participant sex groups, we used this dataset for an in-depth analysis of potential 
sex differences.
In phase 1, participants rated the attractiveness of 90 frontal, greyscale, 
youthful, neutral-expression faces (Burton, White & McNeill, 2010) of their chosen 
sex on a 9 point scale. Participants were asked to consider how much they would 
like to date the individuals in their ratings. Participants rated this image set three 
times. Participants’ idiosyncratic preferences for each face were measured by the 
average of the three ratings from phase 1. We used these averages to rank faces in 
each phase 2 sequence and thereby assess decision performance. The use of 
personalized ratings to assess search performance protected these results against 
influences of extraneous variables, including individual participant and stimulus 
differences, that might affect the likelihood that a given face is chosen or not, apart 
from search strategy. Ratings also exposed participants and models to the prior 
distribution of attractiveness values that populated the sequences. 
In phase 2, participants attempted to stop searching sequences of face 
images when they reached the most attractive face that they could. Participants were 
explicitly instructed to maximize the attractiveness of the faces in their choices. 
Depicted individuals were described as receptive potential partners so that 
participants would understand that they could not be rejected by any of their choices 
(the intention here was to avoid participants deliberately avoiding choosing the most 
8attractiveness faces on the grounds that those individuals might be “out of the 
participant’s league”). Five sequences of 12 faces each were organized using 60 
faces pseudo-randomly selected from phase 1. Participants were informed that (a) 
not every face from phase 1 would be an option in phase 2, (b) they could not know 
the proportion of phase 1 faces used in phase 2, and (c) they could not know how 
many sequences there were and so any sequence might be the last chance to 
achieve an attractive date. The probability was small (0.12) that a specific phase 1 
face would be sampled as an option in any given sequence and there was no 
guarantee that any face would appear in any sequence. The presentation of 
sequence options followed Costa & Averbeck (2015) as closely as possible, because 
this study had successfully replicated the classic undersampling effect using several 
economic, number-based scenarios and the same ideal observer model we used. 
The option screens in our studies (1) reminded participants of their number of 
remaining options in the current sequence and (2) showed, along the bottom of the 
screen, small “reminder” pictures of their refused options for that sequence. In Study 
1, a new sequence was triggered upon choice of an option or if the last option was 
reached. This last option automatically became the chosen face for that sequence 
(once initially refused, options could never be returned to).
Power analysis of Study 1 data suggested that fewer than 20 participants 
would be sufficient for 95% power in Study 2. We enrolled 20 participants in this 
study. All 14 females and one male chose male faces, while all others chose female 
faces. Procedures were the same as Study 1, with the following modifications. Study 
2 aimed to increase the amount of data per participant to facilitate our analysis and 
Bayesian model comparison of psychometric choice functions (28 phase 2 
sequences cf. 5 in Study 1). The 426 rated faces (cf 90 in phase 1) rendered it even 
9more improbable that a given phase 1 face would appear as a sequence option (only 
8 options per sequence, hence a given phase 1 face had <2% chance of appearing 
in any sequence). Under these circumstances, participants should have plenty of 
experience with the distribution of attractiveness values. Waiting for any one specific 
face before stopping searching would be a highly irrational strategy. Study 2 also 
roughly equated time spent on each sequence. After each choice, participants had to 
advance by keypress through grey squares that replaced the remaining pictures, so 
they could not finish sequences early by choosing an early option. In study 2, we 
also reinforced the reward value of choice using a feedback screen, displaying the 
participant’s chosen face, the text “This is your date!”, and a request to rate the 
reward value of the choice on a 9-point scale. As we needed many more faces, we 
sampled faces from a much larger set (Bainbridge, Isola & Oliva, 2013), choosing 
face images with happy expressions (which were numerous in this face set and 
allowed us to replicate with a different expression), which ranged in viewpoint degree 
between frontal and three-quarter view, and were color images of youthful individuals 
(apparently above 18 and less than 30, roughly approximating an undergraduate 
participant population) with circular grey masks. 
Study 3 was originally designed to detect a between-participants effect of a 
mortality salience manipulation, N=70, based on a power analysis of a pilot study 
with N=50. The mortality salience group comparisons were not statistically significant 
(to be reported in separate manuscript). Nevertheless, the amount of data afforded 
by the large sample size was suitable for our goal of using choice data to compare 
participants with different theoretical models and so we applied this dataset to this 
purpose. Procedures were similar to Study 2, with the following exceptions. In phase 
1, the 70 participants (60 female) rated the same 90 faces as in Study 1 (one female 
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chose female faces, two males chose male faces, the rest chose opposite-sex faces) 
twice each and their averages were used to rank sequence options, as before. The 
two ratings were separated by either a mortality salience task or a dentistry 
imagination task (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszcznski & Lyon, 1989). At 
phase 2, participants engaged with seven sequences of eight faces each. 
2.2 The Bayesian modelling framework
Our model was customized for each participant. The model received as 
stimuli, and made decisions about, each corresponding participant’s ratings for the 
faces in the same sequences as that participant experienced. The model, therefore, 
was also susceptible to general mate choice factors, which would have influenced 
that individual participant’s attractiveness preferences, and used a search policy that 
sought to maximize these (participant-defined) factors by stopping searching at as 
highly-rated (by the participant) an option as possible. We chose a model that is 
closely-related mathematically to the model most commonly applied to a similar 
optimal stopping task, the beads task (Averbeck, 2015; Furl & Averbeck, 2011; 
Hauser et al., 2017a; 2017b; Hauser, Moutoussis, Purg, Dayan & Dolan, 2018; 
Moutoussis, Bentall, El-Deredy & Dayan, 2011). Our model also incorporates many 
elements previously considered for Bayesian models of animal sequential mate 
choice (Castellano et al., 2012; Collins, McNamara & Ramsey, 2006; Luttbeg, 1996; 
2002). 
Some previously-proposed optimality solutions, which define a “cutoff” based 
on an ideal search period (Dombrovsky & Perrin, 1994; Ferguson, 1989) have been 
mathematically proven to be optimal, given at least some of a restrictive set of 
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assumptions that define the “secretary problem” version of the task. These 
assumptions include that (1) the agent cannot know or use information about the 
option value sampling distribution, but assumes that this distribution is stationary, (2) 
the agent knows only relative ranks of options but not their absolute values and (3) 
the agent is rewarded only when choosing the highest-ranked sequence option. In 
contrast, our paradigm - a “full information problem” – has no need for these 
assumptions: (1) our participants generated the option sampling distribution 
themselves during phase 1; (2) our participants can directly perceive the absolute 
attractiveness value of each face, rather than its relative rank; (3) Participants are 
instructed to attempt to choose the most attractive face they could possible and had 
no way of knowing with certainty whether they actually achieved the highest-ranked 
face or not. Although it is plausible that cut-off heuristics are somewhat robust to 
violations of some of these assumptions (e.g., Bearden, 2006; Todd & Miller, 1999), 
there is no strong evidence that such heuristics are applicable to “full information 
problems” like our task. In contrast, our choice of model was specifically designed to 
provide normative results on best-choice tasks without making these restrictive 
assumptions (Costa & Averbeck, 2015). 
Conceptually, the model we used computes values for the two possible 
actions (accept option versus decline/sample again) and acts on the higher-valued 
one. The action value for declining the current option can therefore be considered 
the current “aspiration threshold”, which the reward value of the current option must 
exceed for that option to be chosen. Because the action value of declining an option 
depends, in part, on probabilistic forecasts of future reward, the aspiration threshold 
is effectively dynamic and can change as the sequence progresses. 
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Mathematically, the model is based on a discrete time Markov decision 
process with continuous states. Action values combine reward values of potential 
options with internal representations of their probabilities, which are updated by 
every new sample of evidence. The utility u of each state s at time t across all 
available actions is the maximum of the “action values” Q( ,a), which depend on 𝐴𝑆𝑡 𝑠𝑡
( ,a), the reward if action a is taken, and ( ,a), the probability of transitioning to 𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑡 𝑗|𝑠𝑡
each state in the set of potential states S.   𝑢𝑡(𝑠𝑡,𝑎) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑆𝑡{𝑟𝑡(𝑠𝑡,𝑎) +∫𝑆𝑝𝑡(𝑗│𝑠𝑡,𝑎)𝑢𝑡 + 1(𝑗)𝑑𝑗}
Algorithmically, we use backward induction to compute utilities for each new 
state, because they depend on the utilities of subsequent states. Thus, we start by 
computing utilities for the final state which (because there are no state transition 𝑠𝑁, 
probabilities) is simply ( ) for all . Utilities for preceding states can 𝑢𝑁(𝑠𝑁) = 𝑟𝑁 𝑠𝑁 𝑠𝑁 ∈ 𝑁
then be computed as above, working backward from the last to the current one. 
The model considers options as sampled from a Gaussian distribution with a 
N-Inv-χ2 prior (Gelman et al., 2004), which has four parameters: the prior mean  𝜇0
and variance  (set to the mean and variance of the attractive rating distribution in 𝜎20
phase 1, which reflects the participants’ and model’s prior experience with the face 
set) and their respective degrees of freedom  = 2 and  = 1 (set as in Costa & 𝜅0 𝜈0
Averbeck, 2015). Each new sample yields a posterior distribution with new quantities 
, , , . The model’s probabilistic representation of future outcome values is the 𝜇𝑡 𝜎2𝑡 𝜅𝑡 𝜈𝑡
distribution of state transition probabilities when the agent declines an option and 
chooses to sample another . 𝑝𝑡(𝑗│𝑠𝑡,𝑎 = 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)
In addition to these representations of probabilities, action values also depend 
on representations of rewards. We defined a function R to map the outcome ranks 
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onto reward values, whereby the model’s reward was proportional to the 
corresponding participants’ attractiveness rating. Using h as the relative rank of the 
current option (compared to declined options) and N as the number of outcome 
ranks in the sequence, we could compute the reward value of accepting the current 
option as
𝑟𝑡(𝑠𝑡,𝑎 = accept) =  𝑁∑
𝑖 = 1𝑝(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑖) ∗ 𝑅(𝑖 + (ℎ ‒ 1))
The corresponding reward value for declining an option is equivalent to the cost to 
sample, a quantity that in previous research (Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Costa & 
Averbeck, 2015) was usually zero (for an ideal observer model when no extrinsic 
cost was imposed by the experiment) or positive (when either the experiment costed 
samples or participants were assumed to experience an intrinsic aversion to 
sampling).
2.3 Theoretical model comparison
We compared participant data against the ideal observer model to test a null 
hypothesis that participants use a normative solution to this decision problem. The 
ideal observer implemented a cost to sample of zero, as there is no extrinsic cost in 
the study design. However, as reported in the Results, the human behavioral data 
suggested an oversampling bias, compared to the ideal observer. We therefore 
developed three candidate computational theories (described below), and tested 
how well they could predict the pattern of participants’ choice thresholds. Models 
whose predictions conflict with basic patterns of the human behavioral data can be 
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considered falsified (Palminteri, Wyart & Koechlin, 2017; Navarro, 2018), while 
models that can predict the participants’ results continue to be viable candidates. 
We determined participant choice thresholds by computing proportion choices 
in each of eight attractiveness bins and plotting them for every serial position. The 
resultant sigmoidal curves transition from zero choice (below-threshold 
attractiveness) to high levels of choice (above-threshold attractiveness). To estimate 
participant threshold locations for every serial position, we fitted logistic functions to 
these curves and computed points of subjective equality as the logistic inflection 
points. The inflection point estimates the attractiveness level where participants 
begin choosing faces. This analysis required considerable data to ensure there were 
sufficient data for stable proportion choice estimates for every one of these data 
points, for which Study 1 was insufficient (too few sequences per participant and too 
many sequence positions). We therefore performed our model comparisons by 
examining participant thresholds in Study 2 (which has many sequences per 
participant and fewer sequence positions) and 3 (we aggregated sequences over all 
70 participants). 
2.4. Theoretical model development
As reported in the Results, our analysis of psychometric functions showed 
that participants decreased their choice thresholds as sequences progressed (Lee, 
2006). We therefore compared these thresholds against those of three rival 
computational theories that were designed to produce oversampling. Because the 
decreasing choice thresholds we observed in our studies cannot be produced by 
heuristics that do not employ probabilistic representations or use dynamic aspiration 
15
thresholds (e.g., Todd & Miller, 1999), we considered such heuristics prima facie 
falsified (Palminteri, Wyart & Koechlin, 2017) and we focus our more intensive model 
comparison on computational theories that rely on similar probabilistic mechanisms 
as the ideal observer model, as these use dynamic thresholds that in principle could 
reproduce participants’ threshold setting behavior. 
As described in the Introduction, we were inspired by theory from behavioral 
ecology suggesting that animals engaging in sequential mate searches may be 
predisposed to choose mates only with certain high-quality phenotypes (Janetos, 
1980; Real, 1990; Valone et al., 1996; Cheng et al., 2014). We implemented a 
similar idea in the biased values model. Here, the attractiveness values of the 
sequence options are altered (relative to participants’ original attractiveness ratings) 
and the model operates on these altered values. Such might be the case if 
participants normally use a normative probabilistic decision mechanism for decision 
making, but this mechanism is influenced by an external factor at the point of input. 
This external factor could be, among other things, a predisposition induced by the 
mate choice framing of the decision problem. To computationally instantiate such a 
state of affairs, we transformed the sequence values before they were submitted to 
the model using a logistic utility function, which was derived by fitting logistic 
functions (with maximum, sensitivity and bias as free parameters and minimum fixed 
to zero) to participants’ averaged choice probabilities across the attractiveness bins 
(i.e., participant data in Fig. 3, averaged over serial positions). This transformation 
limits the influence that faces below a certain attractiveness level can have over 
choice, effectively raising attractiveness thresholds and leading to oversampling. 
However, the biased values model is not the only way a probabilistic Bayesian model 
like the one we consider might produce the oversampling observed in our 
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participants. Even if the biased values model can predict participant behavior, other 
candidate models would need to be eliminated to draw a strong conclusion. 
One such competitor model that we considered was a sample reward model. 
This model was motivated, in part, because a closely-related Bayesian model using 
a cost to sample term has been proposed to explain the classic undersampling effect 
both for number-based versions of the best-choice task (Costa & Averbeck, 2015) 
and for the beads task and its variants (Hauser et al., 2017b). This model 
characterizes the undersampling that occurs on these tasks as an intrinsic aversion 
to sample, or urgency signal (Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Hauser et al., 2017b). Using 
the same logic, we tested here whether searches might be extended because 
participants find viewing faces rewarding – akin to the apparently addictive qualities 
of on-line dating applications. We adapted our Bayesian model’s cost-to-sample 
parameter (Costa & Averbeck, 2015) to implement an intrinsic reward value for 
sampling, which biases decisions in the direction of continued sampling. We 
employed a negative cost to sample value (-0.035), which was selected to produce 
oversampling equal to that of the mean participant. 
The third model we considered was the attractive prior model, which assumes 
that participants mis-represent the ratings distribution during phase 1, such that their 
prior belief is that faces will be, on average, more attractive than they were actually 
rated as being. Several factors might cause this. Participants’ memory of the phase 1 
set might be biased in favor of remembering more attractive faces than unattractive 
faces. Participants may rely on a different prior than the phase 1 distribution, 
perhaps acquired outside the study setting. Or participants may be susceptible to 
optimism bias, which brings an inflated prior expectation of positive future outcomes. 
Participants with the biased expectation that a highly attractive face might occur will 
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wait longer to choose. We added a constant (0.5) to the prior mean , to produce 𝜇0
oversampling equal to that of the mean participant. 
3 RESULTS
3.1 Optimal sampling? Comparisons with ideal observer
All three studies replicated the finding that participants sample more faces 
before choice than the ideal observer (Fig. 1a-c). Two-tailed t-tests, pairing 
participants with their corresponding models, showed highly significant effects (Study 
1: t(48) = 8.6, P < 0.001; Studies 2 and 3: See Table 1). Despite searching less, the 
ideal observer achieved higher-ranked faces than participants (Fig. 1d-f). Two-tailed 
Friedman tests, pairing participants with their corresponding models, showed highly 
significant differences (Study 1: χ2(1, N = 49) = 13.30, P < 0.001; Studies 2 and 3: 
See Table 2). 
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Table 1. Pairwise two-tailed t-tests for differences between participants and 
models for mean number of samples until choice.
participants sample reward
attractive 
prior biased values
study 2 d = .02
t(19) = .1
P = 1sample 
reward study 3 d = .07
t(69) = -4.0
P = 1
study 2 d = .02
t(19) = .1
P = 1
d = <.001
t(19) < .1
P = 1attractive 
prior study 3 d = .02
t(69) = .1
P = 1
d = .09
t(69) = -.7
P = 1
study 2 d = .53
t(19) = -2.3
P = 0.34
d = .66
t(19) = -2.9
P = 0.1
d = .66
t(19) = -2.8
P = 0.1biased 
values study 3 d = .14
t(69) = -1.2
P = 1
d = .22
t(69) = -1.8
P = .72
d = .13
t(69) = -1.1
P = 1
study 2 d = 2.97
t(19) = 13
P < .001
d = 3.76
t(19) = 16.4
P < .001
d = 3.1
t(19) = 13.5
P < .001
d = 3.25
t(19) = 14.1
P < .001ideal 
observer study 3 d = 1.54
t(69) = 12.8
P < .001
d = 2.17
t(69) = 18
P < .001
d = 2.01
t(69) = 16.7
P < .001
d = 1.87
t(69) = 15.5
P < .001
Note: P-values are Bonferroni-corrected. Tests printed in bold are significant after 
Bonferroni correction for number of pairs in each study. Tests presented in normal 
typeface are significant only when uncorrected. Tests presented in gray are non-
significant, with or without correction. 
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Table 2. Pairwise two-tailed Friedman tests for differences between participants 
and models for mean rank in sequence of chosen option.
participants sample reward
attractive 
prior biased values
study 2 d = 1.27
χ2 = 16.2
P < .001sample 
reward study 3 d = .48
χ2 = 10.6
P = .001
study 2 d = 1.4
χ2 = 12.8
P = .003
d = .08
χ2 < .1
P = 1attractive 
prior study 3 d = 0.54
χ2 = 11.5
P < .001
d = .11
χ2 = 5.9
P = .15
study 2 d = .09
χ2 = .5
P = 1
d = .91
χ2 = 5
P = 0.2
d = 1.09
χ2 = 5
P = .25biased 
values study 3 d = .34
χ2 = 6.1
P = .13
d = .17
χ2 = .1
P = 1
d = .21
χ2 = 2.6
P = 1
study 2 d = 1.44
χ2 = 12.8
P = .003
d = .45
χ2 < 7.2
P = .07
d = .36
χ2 = .8
P = 1
d = 1.05
χ2 < 0.1
P < .001ideal 
observer study 3 d = 0.82
χ2 = 22.9
P < .001
d = .39
χ2 = 5.4
P = .2
d = .27
χ2 = .4
P = .53
d = .46
χ2 = 4.4
P = .35
Note: P-values are Bonferroni-corrected. Tests printed in bold are significant after 
Bonferroni correction for number of pairs in each study. Tests presented in normal 
typeface are significant only when uncorrected. Tests presented in gray are non-
significant, with or without correction.
Participants might oversample, as we observed, if they only chose rare, highly 
attractive faces. If so, participants should show a low, flat response rate across 
positions, with the highest proportion choices for the mandatory last image. This is 
because faces with the highest attractiveness values occur with the same low 
probability at every sequence position and, moreover, have a low probability of 
appearing anywhere in such short sequences. Fig. 2 confirms this response pattern. 
In contrast, the ideal observer chose most frequently about a third of the way through 
the sequence and thereby avoided the default last choice. 
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We also compared how attractiveness thresholds changed as sequences 
progressed. Proportion choices across attractiveness bins (Fig. 3) revealed 
sigmoidal curves, where choice can abruptly transition from zero choice to high 
levels of choice. The attractiveness value (bin) near this transition is taken as the 
choice threshold for that sequence position. We quantitatively estimated this 
threshold location (Fig. 4) as the point of subjective equality (i.e., inflection point of a 
fitted logistic function). Participants adopted nearly the highest possible 
attractiveness thresholds (i.e., bins 7, 8), consistent with a high-risk strategy of 
choosing rare, high-attractiveness faces. In contrast, the ideal observer used much 
lower choice thresholds. The ideal observer realistically estimates probabilities of 
attractiveness values so can accurately predict, for the remaining options, which 
attractiveness values are probable. The finite horizon that participants and the ideal 
observer adopted can be seen as a decline in thresholds toward sequence ends. 
Purpler curves in Fig. 3 are shifted leftward, compared to the bluer ones, and 
thresholds plotted in Fig. 4 are negatively-sloped. 
3.2 Computational explanations for oversampling
To explain how participants deviated from the ideal observer model, we tested 
whether the three hypothetical Bayesian models described in Methods showed the 
same maladaptively high threshold pattern as the participants in Studies 2 and 3 
(where we had sufficient data). When we compared participants, the ideal observer 
and these three new models using an omnibus analysis, we found highly significant 
main effects for both number of samples (ANOVA; Study 2: F(3,54) = 80.34, P < 
0.001; Study 3: F(3,204) = 56.93, P < 0.001) and rank of chosen option (Friedman’s 
test; Study 2: χ2(3, N = 20) = 27.50, P < 0.001; Study 3: χ2(3, N = 70) = 27.45, P < 
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0.001). Post hoc pairwise tests included both t-tests for number of samples and 
Friedman’s tests for ranks – all two-tailed and Bonferroni-corrected for numbers of 
pairs within each study. In both studies (Tables 1 and 2), sample reward, attractive 
prior and biased values models resembled the participants in the sense that they 
oversampled, compared to the ideal observer. We had less evidence available to 
conclude any other pairwise differences between models or participants in the 
amount of sampling (Table 1). In contrast, sample reward and attractive prior models 
chose higher-ranked faces than participants, with less evidence for differences in 
chosen rank with the ideal observer model. The biased values model showed more 
ambiguous effects, with no detectable differences in rank of chosen faces with 
participants or other models (after Bonferroni correction), and a significant difference 
from the ideal observer only in Study 2.
These oversampling and rank measures verify that all three hypothetical 
models are viable explanations of participant oversampling behavior. However, these 
measures cannot easily distinguish whether any model explains participant behavior 
better than the others. We therefore also examined serial position effects. Fig. 2 
shows that sample reward and attractive prior models had overlapping serial position 
curves, with slowly increasing choice rates as sequences progressed. In contrast, 
participants and the biased values model had overlapping serial position curves that 
maintained low choice rates throughout the sequence, resorting about 40% of the 
time to the last sequence option. When proportion choices was further broken down 
by serial position and attractiveness bin (Fig. 3), only the biased values model 
resembled the participants. Like participants, the biased values model used nearly 
the highest possible attractiveness thresholds (Figs. 3) and showed less of a 
threshold decline as sequences progressed, compared to the other models. This is 
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also apparent in the points of subjective equality, where only the biased values 
model closely tracked the participants’ thresholds (Fig. 4). Both sample reward and 
attractive prior models started with high thresholds, but then declined their thresholds 
more quickly than did the participants and biased values model. 
We quantified this similarity of attractiveness thresholds for participants and 
biased values model by correlating participants’ choices in all attractiveness bins and 
sequence positions (Fig. 3) with those of each model. These correlations are plotted 
in Fig. 4 and two-tailed pairwise Bonferroni-corrected significance tests are reported 
in Table 3. In Study 2, all three hypothetical models were better correlated with 
participants’ pattern of choices than was the ideal observer. In both of the studies 
where these models were compared, the biased values model was better correlated 
with participants’ pattern of choices than any of the other models. 
3.3 Sex differences
As a secondary interest, we examined sex differences, given that sexes differ 
in attractiveness discriminability in contexts not requiring optimal stopping (Fletcher, 
Kerr & Valentine, 2014). Some theorists argue that men (but not women) should 
possess cognitive mechanisms adapted for minimising missed mating opportunities 
(Haselton & Bus, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; cf. McKay & Efferson, 
2010; Perilloux & Kurzban, 2015). However, our data offer no strong evidence that 
oversampling bias varies by sex. Agent × face sex interactions were non-significant 
in all three studies (P > 0.08). In Study 1, where sexes were balanced, two-tailed t-
tests using the participants who preferred opposite sex faces (N = 46, 52% female) 
showed no effect of sex on number of samples (P = 0.10) or rank (P = 0.38). 
Bayesian analysis, implemented in JASP (Wagenmakers et al., 2017), showed 
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inconclusive Bayes Factors comparing a sex difference versus no sex difference 
model for sampling (0.882, error = 0.002) and rank (0.40, error = 0.022). We ranked 
both human and model choices according to each participant’s own individual 
attractiveness ratings. As this already controls for individual differences in face 
preferences, sex differences in these preferences may also have been controlled.
Table 3. Pairwise model comparisons between models and participants of 
correlation coefficients of functions relating  sequence position and proportion 
choices (Fig. 3) 
sample 
reward
attractive 
prior
biased values
study 2 d = .27
t(19) = -1.2
P = 1
attractive 
prior
study 3 z = -.8
P = 1
study 2 d = 1.02
t(19) = -4.5
P = .002
d = .9
t(19) = -3.9
P = .006
biased values
study 3 z = -3.5
P = .003
z = -2.7
P = .04
study 2 d = .96
t(19) = 4.2
P = .003
d = 1.15
t(19) = 5.0
P < .001
d = 1.77
t(19) = 7.7
P < .001
ideal observer
study 3 z = 1.1
P = 1
z = 1.9
P = .36
z = 4.6
P < .001
Note: P-values are Bonferroni-corrected. Tests printed in bold are significant 
after Bonferroni correction for number of pairs in each study. Tests presented in 
gray are non-significant, with or without correction.
4 DISCUSSION
4.1 Oversampling versus undersampling 
Previous laboratory studies of optimal stopping have repeatedly shown that 
human participants sample fewer options than is computationally optimal. 
Participants in best-choice tasks are typically asked to choose high-ranked numbers 
in fictitious scenarios including buying a camera, renting an apartment, maximizing 
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salary on a job offer and finding a credit card with a low interest rate (Costa & 
Averbeck, 2015; Seale & Rapoport, 1997; 2000; Sonnemans, 2000; Zwick et al., 
2003). This best-choice task undersampling probably share a common 
computational mechanism with similar undersampling effects that have been 
replicated several times across the variants of a closely-related optimal stopping 
task, the beads task (Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Hauser et al., 2017b; van der Leer, 
Hartig, Goldmanis, McKay, 2015). In parallel, theoretical biologists have, for 
decades, considered sequential searches (analogous to best-choice tasks) to be one 
of the paradigmatic contexts for mate choice and therefore have proposed 
computational models similar to the one we used, which animals could use to solve 
sequential mate choice problems (e.g., Castellano et al., 2012). Inspired by this 
approach, we modified the classic human laboratory number-based best-choice task 
to involve instead a mate choice scenario with images of faces.  Our results 
markedly departed from previous research: human participants sampled more faces 
than was optimal, rather than less. That is, participants sampled more and chose 
lower-ranked outcomes than the ideal observer. This was true, even though 
participants themselves generated the prior distribution of attractiveness values in 
phase 1, which should have indicated to them that extremely high-attractiveness 
faces would rarely appear in any short sequence. This main finding proved replicable 
across three studies that varied image sets, facial expressions, sequence lengths, 
numbers of sequences and other methods. The participants showed declining 
thresholds across serial positions, which accords with previous studies on searches 
for high-ranking numbers (Lee, 2006) and could arise from probabilistic 
representations with dynamic aspiration thresholds. Despite this threshold decrease, 
participants kept thresholds too high throughout sequences. Consequently, they 
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often refused high-ranked, but below-threshold, faces and continued sampling 
options until sequence termination. 
Perhaps the most direct impact of this finding is to call into question existing 
theories of human decision making, which have been designed specifically to predict 
undersampling on optimal stopping tasks. Some theoretical proposals have applied 
the same types of computational models we consider here, incorporating a positive 
intrinsic cost to sample or urgency term to explain undersampling on the number-
based best-choice task (Costa & Averbeck, 2015) and variants of the beads task 
(Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Hauser et al., 2017a). A closely-related explanation (Todd & 
Miller, 1999) supposes that participants will choose a sampling rate below the 
optimal one so long as it maintains near-optimal accuracy. Oversampling, however, 
would be surprising from the perspective of these theories, as they assume that 
lengthy searches are avoided because they consume resources and amplify risks 
(Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Todd & Miller, 1999). Nevertheless, we were motivated by 
similar reasoning to test the sample reward model, which generates oversampling 
from a sampling incentive, rather than a sampling cost. However, this model 
produced a different pattern of choice thresholds than the human participants, and 
so is not the most likely explanation for oversampling. In any case, there is hardly 
any existing consensus that favors this cost to sample explanation for 
undersampling. Alternative theoretical explanations for undersampling include 
overweighting of evidence diagnosticity (van der Leer, Hartig, Goldmanis & McKay, 
2017) and excessive decision noise (Bearden, 2007; Moutoussis et al., 2011). Our 
data does not directly resolve controversy over the undersampling effect. However, 
our framework offers a new theoretical perspective. Our biased values model, which 
at least seems to explain oversampling, suggests that sampling biases can arise 
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when option values are externally-weighted by other processes prior to their input 
into an otherwise-optimal probabilistic reasoning mechanism. 
4.2 When does oversampling occur?
Why did this differential weighting and its consequent effect on choice 
thresholds and sampling rates, occur in our study but not previous ones? Many 
elements of our design, such as roughly normal option sampling distributions, 
numbers of options, numbers of sequences and reminders of previously rejected 
stimuli have all previously led to undersampling on the number-based task (Costa & 
Averbeck, 2015). Our three studies also replicate our finding across variations in 
experimental design elements such as numbers of sequences (from 5 to 28) and 
sequence options (8 or 15). Previous theories to explain the undersampling effect do 
not raise any predictions that simple design elements would negate the 
undersampling effect. Thus, any answer to the question of what causes 
oversampling would bring important theoretical implications. Our results here 
suggest that human sampling biases are not as predictable as previously believed 
and that further research will be needed to conclusively predict when participants will 
oversample, undersample or be optimal. Here, we discuss the two most obvious 
possibilities.
The most obvious difference between our paradigm and previous ones 
involves the mate choices that are implied when maximizing facial attractiveness. 
This possibility accords with the biased values model, which was broadly inspired by 
biological theory proposing that mate-choosing animals set high thresholds, perhaps 
genetically determined (Cheng et al., 2014) on phenotypic variation when 
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sequentially searching mates (Gibson, & Langren, 1996; Janetos, 1980; Real, 1990; 
Valone, Nordell, Giraldeau & Templeton, 1996), to the extent that some animals 
won’t mate if sufficiently attractive options are not encountered. Our participants did 
not directly choose mates in our paradigm. They attempted to stop on the most 
attractive face possible, where attractive was explicitly defined as a desire to date 
the person. Moreover, mate choice does not uniquely occur only in the decision 
structure we presented to participants. Nevertheless, one possibility is that the 
activity of assessing attractiveness and the mention of a dating decision frame is 
sufficient to instigate mate choice predispositions. Such predispositions could then 
bias otherwise-optimal probabilistic choice mechanisms, in the way described by the 
biased valued model. 
While the idea that the mate choice frame leads to oversampling via the 
biased values mechanism is a likely explanation, there are other differences between 
our paradigm and previous ones that require further study. A second obvious 
difference from previous work is the use of naturalistic image stimuli to convey option 
values to participants, instead of abstract stimuli like numbers conveying prices 
(Costa & Averbeck, 2015), relative ranks (Seale & Rapaport, 1997) or fictitious bead 
colors (Furl & Averbeck, 2011). A potential role for images in determining search 
strategy is intriguing because many real world searches (in addition to on-line dating 
applications) depend on natural images in general and face images in particular. In 
this case, hitherto unpredicted effects of decision domain may be more widespread 
than previously thought. Some real-world contexts, such as sequential eyewitness 
lineups or border control, require agents to assess sequentially-presented faces. 
These agents can only commit time and resources when sufficiently familiar faces 
are presented. Aside from face images, consumers engage with sequentially-
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presented naturalistic images when shopping for goods on-line and in catalogues. 
Many such situations involve choosing between committing to a pictorially depicted 
option and terminating search and forgoing an option to which it may be costly or 
impossible to return (e.g., a limited-time sale). Although one may have predicted only 
undersampling in these contexts previously, our results pose new empirical 
questions about whether different decision domains may induce different patterns of 
searching.
Are there also implications of our results for real-world mate searches in 
humans? Behavioral ecologists have long considered sequential search a 
fundamental mate choice context for animals (Beckers & Wagner, 2011; Castellano 
et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2014; Collins, McNamara & Ramsey, 2006; Ivy & Sakalu, 
2007; Luttbeg, 1996; 2002; Janetos, 1980; Real, 1990; Valone et al., 1996). Many 
scholars, starting with Kepler, assumed that human mate choice was a context with 
optimal stopping elements (Eriksson & Strimling, 2009; Guan, Lee & Silva 2014; 
Todd, Billari & Simão, 2005; Todd & Miller, 1999), giving rise to characterizations 
such as the “fiancé(e) problem” (Ferguson, 1989). Based on similar reasoning, 
previous research examined sequential mate choice contexts in paradigms 
simulating speed dating and on-line dating (Beckage, Todd, Penke, Asendorpf, 
2009; Taubert et al., 2016) and has proposed that marriage rates are predictable 
based on best-choice optimal stopping logic (Todd et al., 2005). Our paradigm has 
enabled, for the first time, an application of computational probabilistic decision 
theory to facial attractiveness choices. Despite this existing theoretical and empirical 
interest in mate choice as a sequential search problem, directly extending our results 
to human mate choices “in the wild” remains complicated and requires further data. 
The principal obstacle may be that there is not one “canonical mate choice context” 
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but a vast diversity of mate-related contexts and decisions (e.g., commit to a date 
Saturday versus proposing marriage), not all of which are sequential. In general, our 
results may simply apply to any case where an agent must choose between 
committing exclusively to a receptive partner or moving on to explore other options. 
The frequency of these situations in the real world and whether they replicate the 
same decision biases remain open empirical questions.
4.3 Theories of decision making based on probabilistic representation
We tested rival computational theories to explain the oversampling bias. All 
three of our models successfully reproduced the participants’ oversampling bias and 
we distinguished among them based on their ability to predict participants’ dynamic 
aspiration thresholds across sequence positions. We considered probabilistic models 
with dynamic thresholds that could produce the participants’ threshold changes. Two 
of our models showed threshold changes that conflicted with those of the 
participants. Our sample reward model implemented an intrinsic reward for sampling 
more options, as might be expected if viewing attractive faces is rewarding. We also 
tested an “attractive prior” model in which the prior distribution had a maladaptively 
high mean value, as might be the case if the values of highly attractive individuals 
were especially well-encoded during the rating phase, if the prior distribution were 
skewed by experience outside the laboratory setting or if participants were subject to 
an optimism bias. While reward sample and attractive prior models produced some 
similar results to our participants, including oversampling biases, they also both 
manifested a precipitous threshold drop over sequence positions that did not match 
the more modest decline shown by our participants (Fig. 4). This occurs because 
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thresholds in these two models can quickly re-adjust toward optimal as sequences 
progress. When there are fewer samples remaining to view, the sample reward 
model loses its prospect for future reward and incentive to continue sampling. 
Likewise, the attractive prior model learns from newly sampled values and thereby 
can quickly update and correct its probability distribution of values. Thus, both 
models start sequences with a bias but revert toward optimal as sequences 
progress.  Although we have focused on some models that could plausibly 
reproduce oversampling and dynamic thresholds, our results cannot fully exclude all 
models or further modifications that might also reproduce our study data. 
The evidence we have at hand favors a biased values model, in which the 
attractiveness values are non-linearly transformed prior to an otherwise-optimal 
decision process. The models we tested are, at best, approximations to the brain’s 
computations. Nevertheless, the core idea is that participants compute decision 
variables based on probabilistic representations of possible outcomes. This 
conclusion builds on evidence showing similar probabilistic reasoning mechanisms 
involved in other types of optimal stopping contexts (Castellano et al., 2012; Costa & 
Averbeck, 2015; Furl & Averbeck, 2011; Moutoussis et al., 2011). These 
mechanisms need not be specialized for solving best-choice tasks. Similar 
probabilistic representations could flexibly contribute to reward-guided decision-
making more generally (Averbeck, 2015; Gottlieb & Oudeyer, P-Y, 2018; Kolossa & 
Fingscheidt, 2015). 
There are alternate theoretical approaches worth discussing. These were not 
included in our model comparison because they either (1) represent only partial 
theoretical accounts that don’t fully specify computations participants hypothetically 
use to solve best-choice problems; (2) use static aspiration thresholds that cannot in 
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principal reproduce the dynamic threshold strategies used by our participants or (3) 
they have not yet been fully developed as solutions for the “full information” version 
of the best-choice problem that we consider here. For example, cut-off heuristics 
propose that participants set a static aspiration threshold based on a learning period 
(Seale & Rapoport, 1997). These heuristics theories are based directly on a 
mathematical proof that provides an optimal solution to “secretary problems”. 
Secretary problems are a special class of optimal stopping decisions and the optimal 
solutions mathematically holds only for its set of restrictive assumptions. Heuristic 
cut-off theories suppose that participants are aware of use this optimal solution and 
use a version of it that limits sampling slightly. This heuristic modification can lead to 
near-optimal performance in the context of secretary problem with less (potentially 
costly) sampling (Todd & Miller, 1999). However, the assumptions of the secretary 
problem do not hold in our paradigm (see Methods). Moreover, to accommodate our 
participant data, this heuristic would need further modification to explain why 
participants would increase rather than decrease sampling for our paradigm. More 
importantly, the heuristic would also need to be modified to have a dynamic 
aspiration threshold to replicate our participant’s thresholds. Similarly, other models 
in the literature (Lee, 2006) would also need modification, as existing formulations 
also do not, at present, specify how participants compute their dynamic thresholds. 
On the whole, probabilistic representations like those we consider (Costa & 
Averbeck, 2015) are already well-suited by their design to full information problems 
like we consider. Further, they can provide a priori predictions about how participants 
compute their decisions that can reproduce the main features of our participants’ 
data.
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4.4 Conclusions
Our results suggest that surprisingly different biases might arise depending on 
decision context. Our evidence favoring the biased values model suggests that the 
attractiveness values (perceived phenotypes) that are entered into optimal 
probabilistic choice mechanisms are perhaps non-linearly related to those expressed 
in subjective ratings. Our approach aims to begin to disentangle influences of 
physical attractiveness and decision context in a way that allows us to bring to bear 
rigorous computational modelling methods that reveal new insights into human 
decision computations that could not otherwise be demonstrated. This approach 
continues the unification of a common cognitive framework that ties together 
theoretical development in mathematics, economics and behavioral ecology.
33
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS. N.F., R.T.M. and B.B.A. designed studies. B.B.A. & 
N.F. implemented computational models. N.F. analyzed data. N.F. wrote the paper, 
and B.B.A. and R.T.M. provided critical revisions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. We would like to thank Farah Atari, Laura Davies, Molly 
Haley, Iulia Nistor, Demi Riley-Carlaw, Galini Pantelidou and Alexandrina Vasilichi 
for assistance with data collection and Annabelle Gall for assistance developing 
stimuli. 
DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST: none
“R.T.M. acknowledges funding support from the Cogito Foundation [grant number 
R10917].”
34
5. REFERENCES
Averbeck BB. (2015). Theory of choice in bandit, information sampling and 
foraging tasks. PLoS Computational Biology, 11, e1004164.
Bainbridge, W.A., Isola, P. & Oliva, A. (2013). The intrinsic memorability of 
face images. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 1323-1334.
Bearden, J.N. (2006). A new secretary problem with rank-based selection and 
cardinal payoffs. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 50, 58-59.
Bearden, J.N. (2007). On generalized secretary problems. In Uncertainty and 
risk (eds Abdellaoui et al.), pp. 187-205. Springer.
Bearden, J.N., Rapoport, A. & Murphy, R.O. (2006). Sequential observation 
and selection with rank-dependent payoffs: An experimental study. Management 
Science, 52, 1437-1449.
Beckers, O.M. & Wagner Jr, W.E. (2011). Mate sampling strategy in a field 
cricket: evidence for a fixed threshold strategy with last chance option. Animal 
Behaviour, 81, 519-527.
Beckage, N., Todd, P.M., Penke, L. & Asendorpf, J.B. (2009). Testing 
sequential patterns in human mate choice using speed dating. In Proceedings of the 
2009 Cognitive Science Conference (eds. N Taatgen, H van Rijn), pp. 2365-2370. 
Cognitive Science Society.
Burton, A.M., White, D. & McNeill A. (2010). The Glasgow Face Matching 
Test. Behavior Research Methods, 42, 286-291.
Castellano, S., Cadeddu, G. & Cermelli, P. (2012). Computational mate 
choice: Theory and empirical evidence. Behavioural Processes, 90, 261-277.
35
Cheng R., Seubert, S.M., & Wiegmann, D.D. (2014). Computational and 
Structural Biotechnology, 10, 8-11.
Collins, E.J., McNamara, J.M. & Ramsey, D.M. (2006). Learning rules for 
optimal selection in a varying environment: Mate choice revisited. Behavioral 
Ecology, 17, 799-809.
Costa, V.D. & Averbeck, B.B. (2015). Frontal-parietal and limbic-striatal activity 
underlies information sampling in the best choice problem. Cerebral Cortex, 25, 972-
982.
Dombrovsky, Y. & Perrin, N. (1994). On adaptive search and optimal stopping 
in sequential mate choice. The American Naturalist, 144, 355-361.
Eriksson, K. & Strimling, P. (2009). Partner heuristics in the lab: Stability iof 
matchings under various preference structures. Adaptive Behavior, 17, 524-536.
Ferguson, T.S. (1989). Who solved the secretary problem? Statistical Science, 
4, 282-289. 
Fletcher, G.J.O., Kerr, P.S.G., Li, N.P. & Valentine, K.A. (2014). Predicting 
romantic interest and decisions in the very early stages of mate selection: Standards, 
accuracy and sex differences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 540-
550.
Furl, N. (2016). Facial-Attractiveness Choices Are Predicted by Divisive 
Normalization. Psychological Science, 27, 1379-1387.
Furl, N. & Averbeck, B.B. (2011). Parietal cortex and insula relate to evidence 
seeking relevant to reward-related decisions. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 
17572-17582.
Gelman, A., Carlin, J.B., Stern, H.S. & Rubin, D.B. (2004). Bayesian data 
analysis. New York: Chapman and Hall/CRC.
36
Gibson, R.M. & Langen, T.A. (1996) How do animals choose their mates? 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 11, 468-470.
Gottlieb, J. & Oudeyer P-Y. (2018). Towards a neuroscience of active 
sampling and curiosity. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 19, 7580770.
Guan, H., Lee, M.D., & Silva, A. (2014). Threshold models of human decision 
making on optimal stopping problems in different environments. In P. Bello, M. 
Guarini, M. McShane, & B. Scassellati (Eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 553-558. Austin, TX: Cognitive 
Science Society
Hahn, A.C., & Perrett, D.I. (2014). Neural and behavioral responses to 
attractiveness in adult and infant faces. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 23, 
591-603.
Haselton, M.G. & Buss, D.M. (2000). Error management theory: A new 
perspective on biases in cross-sex mind reading. The Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78, 81–91.
Haselton, M.G. & Nettle, D. (2006). The paranoid optimist: An integrative 
evolutionary model of cognitive biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
10, 47–66.
Hauser, T.U., Moutoussis, M., Iannaccone, R., Brem, S., Walitza, S., 
Drechsler, R., Dayan, P. & Dolan, R.J. (2017a). Increased decision thresholds 
enhance information gathering performance in juvenile Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD). PLoS Computational Biology, 13, e1005440.
Hauser, T.U., Moutoussis, M., NSPN Consortium, Dayan, P. & Dolan, R.J. 
(2017b). Increased decision thresholds trigger extended information gathering across 
the compulsivity spectrum. Translational Psychiatry, 7, 1296. 
37
Hauser, T.U., Moutoussis, M., Purg, N., Dayan, P. & Dolan, R.J. (2018). Beta-
Blocker Propranolol Modulates Decision Urgency During Sequential Information 
Gathering. The Journal of Neuroscience, 38:7170-7178.
Ivy, T. & Sakaluk, S. (2007). Sequential mate choice in decorated crickets: 
females use a fixed internal threshold in pre- and postcopulatory choice. Animal 
Behavior, 74, 1065-1072.
Janetos, A.C. (1980). Strategies of Female Mate Choice: A Theoretical 
Analysis. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 7, 107-112.
Kolling, N., Scholl, J., Chekroud, A., Trier, H.A. & Rushworth, M.F.S. (2018). 
Prospection, Perseverance, and Insight in Sequential Behavior. Neuron, 99, 1069-
1082.
Kolossa, A., Kopp, B. & Fingscheidt, T. (2015). A computational analysis of the 
neural basis of Bayesian inference. Neuroimage, 106, 222-237.
Lee, M.D. (2006). A hierarchical Bayesian model of human decision-making 
on an optimal stopping problem. Cognitive Science, 30, 1-26.
Luttbeg, B. (1996). A comparative Bayes tactic for mate assessment and 
choice. Behavioral Ecology, 7, 451-460.
Luttbeg, B. (2002). Assessing the robustness and optimality of alternative 
decision rules with varying assumptions. Animal Behaviour, 63, 805-814.
Malhotra G., Leslie, D.S., Ludwig, C.J.H. & Bogacz, R. (2018). Time-varying 
decision boundaries: Insights from optimality analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, 25, 971-996.
McKay, R. & Efferson, C. (2010). The subtleties of error management. 
Evolution and Human Behaviour, 31, 309-319.
38
Moutoussis, M., Bentall, R.P., El-Deredy, W. & Dayan, P. (2011). Bayesian 
modelling of jumping-to-conclusions bias in delusional patients. Cognitive 
Neuropsychiatry, 16, 422-447.
Navarro, D. (2018). Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Tensions 
Between Scientific Judgement and Statistical Model Selection. Computational Brain 
& Behavior, 1-7.
Palminteri, S., Wyart, V & Koechlin, E. (2017). The importance of falsification 
in computational cognitive modeling. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21, 425-433.
 Perilloux, C. & Kurzban, R. (2015). Do men overperceive women’s sexual 
interest? Psychological Science, 26, 70-77.
Real, L. (1990). Search theory and mate choice. I. Models of single-sex 
discrimination. The American Naturalist, 136, 376-404.
Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T. & Lyon, D. (1989). 
Evidence For Terror Management Theory: I. The Effects of Mortality Salience on 
Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 57, 681-690.
Seale, D. & Rapoport, A. (1997). Sequential Decision Making with Relative 
Ranks: An Experimental Investigation of the "Secretary Problem". Organizational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 69, 221-236.
Seale, D. & Rapoport, A. (2000). Optimal stopping behavior with relative 
ranks: The secretary problem with unknown population size. Journal of Decision 
Making, 13, 391-411.
Sonnemans J. 2000 Decisions and strategies in a sequential search 
experiment. J. Econ. Psychol. 21, 91-102.
39
Solway, A. & Botvinick, M. (2012). Goal-directed decision-making as 
probabilistic inference: A computational framework and potential neural correlates. 
Psychological Review, 119, 120-154.
Taubert, J., Van der Burg, E. & Alais, D. (2016). Love at second sight: 
Sequential dependence of facial attractiveness in an on-line dating paradigm. 
Scientific Reports, 6, 22740.
Todd, P.M., Billari, F.C. & Simão, J. (2005). Aggregate age-at-marriage 
patterns from individual mate-search heuristics. Demography, 42, 559-574.
Todd, P.M & Miller, G.F. (1999). From pride and prejudice to persuasion: 
Satisficing in mate search. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (eds. G 
Gigerenzer, PM Todd), pp 287-308. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Valone, T.J., Nordell, S.E., Giraldeau, L-A. & Templeton, J.J. (1996). The 
empirical question of thresholds and mechanisms of mate choice. Evolutionary 
Ecology, 10, 447-455.
van der Leer, L., Hartig, B., Goldmanis, M. & McKay, R. (2015). Delusion 
proneness and 'jumping to conclusions': relative and absolute effects. Psychological 
Medicone, 45, 1253-1262.
van der Leer, L., Hartig, B., Goldmanis, M. & McKay, R. (2017). Why do 
delusion-prone individuals “jump to conclusions”? An investigation using a non-serial 
data gathering paradigm. Clinical Psychological Science, 5, 718-725.
Vul, E., Goodman, N., Griffiths, T. & Tenenbaum, J. (2014). One and Done: 
Optimal decisions from very few samples. Cognitive Science, 38, 599-637.
Wagenmakers, E.J., Love, J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., …  
Morey, R.D. (2017). Bayesian inference for psychology. Part II: Example applications 
40
with JASP. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review doi: 10.3758/s13423-017-1323-7. 
[Epub ahead of print].
Huang, Y. & Rao, R.P.N. Reward optimization in the primate brain: A 
probabilistic model of decision making under uncertainty. PLoS One, 8, e53344.
Zwick, R., Rapoport, A., Chung, Lo A, Muthukrishnan, A.V. (2003). Consumer 
sequential search: Not enough or too much? Marketing Science, 22, 503-519.
41
Figure 1. Oversampling biases. Mean number of faces that participants and 
models sampled until choice are shown for Studies 1 (a), 2 (b) and 3 (c). Mean 
attractiveness rank in each sequence of chosen faces is shown for Studies 1 (d), 2 
(e) and 3 (f). Distributions are indicated by kernel densities overlaid with individual 
data points with white horizontal lines denoting mean values.
Figure 2. Serial position effects. Mean proportion choices for each sequence 
position are shown for participants and models. Shaded areas show 95% confidence 
intervals. Panels a-c are Studies 1-3.
Figure 3. Proportion choices for each attractiveness bin plotted separately for 
each serial position.
Figure 4. Model comparisons. Points of subjective equality (attractiveness 
thresholds, measured as inflection points of logistic functions fitted to data in Fig. 3) 
are shown for Studies 2 (a) and 3 (b). To directly compare the models’ ability to 
explain participant behavior, correlations between participants’ behavior and that of 
each model were computed for the patterns of data shown in Fig. 3. For Study 2, 
correlations were computed between data from each model and performance from its 
corresponding participant. Shown are average correlations and their 95% confidence 
intervals over these participant/model pairs (c). In Study 3, each correlation was 
computed between data from a model and performance aggregated over all 
participants.
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